The prolonged violence in Manipur, which started on May 3, not only fails to offer a viable solution, but it also starkly exposes the vested interests who are reaping advantages from its perpetuation. It is apparent that the central leadership, spearheaded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah, has consciously allowed for divergent approaches in their dealings with appointee Chief Minister N. Biren Singh, who follows their directives and the Kuki insurgents, with whom the centre engages in a protracted game.
The ongoing violence has claimed numerous lives, left villages in ruins, and caused the displacement of many people within the state.
Manipur has transformed into a battleground for political clashes between diametric ideological proponents of mainland India, marked by contrasting narratives and partisan positions. This unfolded for the first time in the state amidst a period when the intensification of ethnic divisions appears to be reaching its peak at the highest echelons. However, the genesis of the ongoing violence remains obscured within the conflicting groups in the state, and a comprehensive retrospective analysis encompassing both the ruling political class and the structure of the state holds significant potential.
Under the BJP’s central leadership, communal violence across the country is unsurprising. As exemplified by the June 18, 2001 incident during BJP rule at the centre after the infamous Indo-Naga ceasefire Agreement, where protesters in the valley set fire to the Manipur Assembly, subsequently leading people to vote for representatives based on ethnic political aspirations.
One evident phenomenon in Manipur is that whenever there is tension or conflict between ethnic groups, there is an observable tendency for increased efforts to establish closer ties with the centre.
Despite multiple narratives highlighting the historical connections involving religious sentiments to the Hindu-dominated mainland brought by certain ruling upper-class sections at various points in time, Meiteis of Manipur maintain a different mindset that continues to resist the Indian state.
In the last few decades, the erosion of trust among the Meiteis towards the centre intensified due to counterinsurgency operations and counter-narratives which challenge the regressive policies of the Indian state.
Further, the concerns of the Meiteis residing in the valley about losing legislative control have reached unprecedented levels. And the intensity of insecurities has grown to such a degree that it becomes difficult to fathom a future where instances from the past, such as having Tangkhul (Nagas) and even a minority Pangal (Manipur Muslim) serving as state CMs may seem unimaginable in the coming decades.
Various calls for demands to protect the state’s ethnic communities are driven both by dissatisfaction with historical treatment by the Indian state and the belief that constitutional safeguards will secure their land and resources.
While examining the practical implementation of constitutional protection mechanisms within specific political conflicts, it becomes evident that it is only partially, provisionally, and incompletely accomplished. Usually, the introduction of new recognition mechanisms is hindered by constraints imposed by both the political landscape and identities involved in the negotiations.
The various constitutional protection measures laid down under the Indian Constitution have become a dominant aspiration among ethnic communities in the Northeast for achieving a just postcolonial settlement that is perceived to address historical injustices and ensure rightful representation and autonomy.
Despite the ubiquity of the constitutional protection debate, the question of what can be expected to achieve remains wide open. The opacity of constitutional protection can be found in the exchange of narratives built after the eruption of every ethnic tension in Manipur.
A comprehensive grasp of constitutional safeguards is crucial, not only for understanding the current deadlock between the Meiteis and Kukis but also for comprehending the historical and future interrelationships among various ethnic groups in Manipur.
Although Manipur was granted Part C status after merging into the Indian Union and then received union territory status on November 1, 1956, it was further upgraded to a Territorial Legislative Assembly in 1963.
Widespread discontent among the integrationist Meiteis, who envisioned a future with India, led to the granting of statehood on January 21, 1972.
The Manipur (Hills Areas) Autonomous District Council Act of 1971 meant to safeguard the hill areas and protect the tribal communities in Manipur, although it is significantly less comprehensive compared to the special treatment given to Nagaland under Article 371-A.
Meiteis in the valley agitated to protect the constitutional status of the Manipuri language (Meiteilon) and have it included in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which was achieved on August 20, 1992.
A discernible trend is evident in Manipur, where a robust mass movement is aligning with a downward oscillation in armed insurgency. This movement, primarily driven by so claimed ‘civil society’ entities in the valley of Manipur, has often been criticized by the hill communities for its perceived collusion with state and non-state insurgent groups that prioritize the interests of the Meitei majority.
Over the past few decades, this movement gained momentum, impacting the region’s dynamics.
The demand for implementation of the Inner Line Permit (ILP) system and Scheduled Tribe (ST) status in Manipur reflects a perceived threat to tribal land rights and exacerbates their marginalization. In the context of Manipur, where Kukis are targeted, the nationwide call by the right-wing BJP for implementing the NRC, which specifically targets Muslims for deportation as “illegal immigrants,” falls into alignment.
The political imagination of the Kukiland or Zalengam or Zongam narrative within academia is frequently seen as a result of the simultaneous escalation and deliberate targeting of these groups by the BJP-sponsored government led by N. Biren Singh.
This phenomenon is evident in the collective actions of society, progressively growing over time. This further led to the emergence of some chauvinist groups among the Meiteis, remotely controlled by certain leaders of the BJP government in the state, which has fuelled the ongoing violence, as has been openly claimed by Kukis and sputtered by certain Meitei activists, thus exacerbating the situation.
As an outcome, Kukis are currently advocating for and envisioning a separate administration as the sole viable resolution to the ongoing deadlock.
Currently, there is an urgent need to reevaluate the longstanding demands for the Sixth Schedule amidst increasing calls for separate administration in the form of statehood or a union territory after the outbreak of violence in Manipur.
The Manipur (Hills Areas) Autonomous District Council Act enacted in 1971 bestowed limited executive and financial powers upon the councils, in contrast to the comprehensive judicial and legislative powers granted by the sixth schedule of the Indian constitution.
As a result, there has been an increasing call to extend the Sixth Schedule to facilitate the establishment of empowered Autonomous District Councils and enable self-governance in the hill regions of Manipur.
The Sixth Schedule can be a significant constitutional achievement for ethnic tribes in the northeast, particularly the Kukis. However, it has already demonstrated the incomplete nature of constitutional recognition in practice which is evident from the experiences in the states of Northeast, as it has neglected fundamental and crucial aspects of self-governance.
In situations where the entire national autonomous institution lacks substantial responsibilities, every entity remains reliant on and subordinate to central authorities who govern the entire territory. Although forms of self-governance, such as the Sixth Schedule, may seem appealing in theory, they lack legal enforceability and are merely symbolic acknowledgements.
Meitei intellectual and civil society leaders in the valley oppose the call for the Sixth Schedule in the hill districts of Manipur, arguing that the establishment of district councils would jeopardize the state’s territorial integrity.
The fear among the Meiteis regarding the potential direct financial relationship between the Kukis and the central government, if the sixth schedule is implemented in Manipur, is unwarranted. This concern arises at a time when the prospects of development in the sixth schedule areas are at stake. In the realm of political movements, specifically in the Northeast, different ethnic communities have employed the construction of distinct geopolitical narratives to negotiate with the central powers, exemplified by the case of Nagalim, which aims to integrate the Nagas of India and Myanmar.
The Meiteis, who consistently advocate for integration, must inquire about the present-day historical circumstances that led to opposing nationalistic movements in Manipur, movements that they perceive as endangering the unity and integrity of the state.
At present, to foster inclusivity and address the concerns of the Kukis within the broader idea of Manipur, the majority Meiteis should initiate to relook or formulate suitable administrative mechanisms, such as the Sixth Schedule or any other alternative frameworks, through minimal engagement with the central government.
Dear Reader,
Every day, our team at EastMojo travels through rain, rough roads, and remote hills to bring you stories that matter – stories from your town, your people, your Northeast.
We do this because we believe in truthful, independent journalism. No big corporate backing, no government pressure – just honest reporting by local journalists who live and breathe the same air you do.
But to keep doing this work, we need you. Your small contribution helps us pay our reporters fairly, reach places others ignore, and keep asking the tough questions.
If you believe the Northeast deserves its own fearless voice, stand with us.
Support independent journalism. Be a Member.
Thank you,
Karma Paljor
Editor-in-Chief, eastmojo.com
The Indian Constitution is replete with limitations imposed on the constituent states regarding their autonomy in determining and shaping their systems of self-governance. However, any design of administrative structure or arrangement should align with the consultative meetings and dialogues involving not only Meiteis and Kukis but also of Nagas, Pangal etc. within the state as the implementation of these decisions can lead to diverse outcomes.
Any such constitutional mechanisms should not be seen as the attainment of a final postcolonial settlement, but rather as a temporary achievement that necessitates the development of a collective and inclusive Manipur.
And to look for a long-lasting solution requires continuing contestation and renegotiation with the centre exploring the mechanisms beyond the confines of the Indian constitution.
Addressing the issue requires the inclusion of provisions or norms that may lie outside the codified constitutional text. Hence, the key to resolving the core problems in the state of Manipur lies in altering the fundamental distribution of public power among the constituent communities fostering unity and territorial integrity, whether situated within or outside the ambit of the Indian constitution.
The author is a PhD Scholar at Centre for the Study of Law and Governance at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views expressed are personal.
Also Read | Manipur violence: SC asks Centre, state to ensure safety of citizens