How Manipur crisis impacts Indo-ASEAN relations with Myanmar

On December 6, 2024, India’s Union Home Minister Amit Shah finalized new guidelines to scrap a six-year-old Free Movement Agreement (FMR) that allowed residents from both nations to travel 16 km into each other’s territory without a visa.

He further affirmed that India would seal the 1,643 km (1,020-mile) boundary in the same manner as “we have fenced the country’s border with Bangladesh,” which is nearly double the length. The decision to fence the border—shared by four northeastern states: Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh—will eventually hinder human ties and undermine development projects strategically introduced to connect India to Southeast Asia.

Against this backdrop, this paper examines the major challenges faced by New Delhi and the failed aspirations of people in the region.

Linkages between the Manipur and Myanmar Crises

Both Manipur and Myanmar are currently grappling with prolonged conflicts and struggling to find pathways toward peaceful resolution. While both regions suffer internal strife, Manipur’s situation is further complicated by external factors.

A significant concern is the influx of undocumented immigrants—primarily from the Kuki community—following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. This migration has been cited as one of the contributing factors to the ongoing instability in Manipur, manifesting in the Meitei-Kuki conflict, alongside the Meitei community’s demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.

There are two major shortcomings on India’s part. First is the inadequate assessment by the Indian government of the risks posed by the 2021 Myanmar coup, which displaced nearly two million people.

This mass displacement has had a spillover effect on India’s northeastern states, fueling ethnic nationalism in Manipur. Second is the central government’s indifferent and insufficient response, which has deepened the trust deficit.

The announcement of border fencing further aggravated tensions, receiving opposition from local communities who share deep cultural, familial, and economic ties across the border. The lack of a viable solution has intensified dissatisfaction and fractured the population along multiple lines.

Accessing Borderland Geopolitics

The border between Manipur and Myanmar has become a site of contestation, defined by the interplay between security imperatives and long-standing socio-cultural and economic relationships.

Moreh, a key town along the border, serves as a vital lifeline for various communities in Manipur—Meiteis, Nagas, Kukis, Meitei-Pangals, Tamils, Nepalis, Konyaks, Bengalis, and others. Even during the 100-day blockade of National Highways NH-39 and NH-53, Moreh served as an alternate trade route, underscoring its commercial importance.

India and Myanmar share centuries-old historical ties grounded in spirituality, ethnicity, language, and culture. The Indo-Myanmar border has long functioned not only as a physical boundary but as a gateway for economic cooperation and cross-border community interaction.

These ties were envisioned to strengthen further under India’s Look East Policy, which promotes economic integration with Southeast Asia.

Myanmar is the only ASEAN member country that shares a land border with India, making it a critical link in regional connectivity. India has extended over $2 billion in development assistance to Myanmar, supporting infrastructure, higher education, and cultural restoration projects.

In the midst of the ongoing conflict, Union Home Minister Amit Shah reiterated Prime Minister Modi’s commitment to building an “impenetrable” border. He noted that a 10-km stretch in Moreh has already been fenced.

Additionally, two pilot projects using a Hybrid Surveillance System (HSS) are underway, covering 1 km each in Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. Further fencing of approximately 20 km in Manipur has been approved, with work expected to begin soon.

However, months after suspending the Free Movement Regime, the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced a revised protocol reducing the permissible range from 16 km to 10 km on either side of the largely unfenced international border. According to The Hindu, abolishing the FMR would require deeper negotiations culminating in a bilateral agreement with Myanmar—one that is still pending.

Complex Realities of the FMR

The Indo-Myanmar border remains one of the most porous and contentious boundaries in the region. Cross-border ties among indigenous communities have long posed challenges to maintaining peace, stability, and economic growth.

Amid the current crisis, the FMR has become a flashpoint between local populations and the central government, especially after the February 8, 2024 decision by the Government of India to abolish the regime.

While the border has indeed facilitated illegal migration, insurgency, and smuggling of arms and drugs, it also supports livelihoods and sustains vital cross-cultural links for tribal communities.

The debate over fencing has created deep divisions. Stricter entry protocols, implemented on January 1, 2025, now regulate interactions among hill tribes, with access restricted on both sides.

The decision to scrap the FMR has split regional alliances. Nagaland and Mizoram have strongly opposed the move, while Manipur—under Chief Minister N. Biren Singh—has endorsed the cancellation and urged the Ministry of Home Affairs to accelerate the process.

The Manipur government has also backed the construction of over 70 km of fencing and the formation of special task forces to curb illegal migration through the Indo-Myanmar border.

In contrast, massive protests erupted in Nagaland on April 3, 2025, with demonstrators opposing the termination of the FMR. Nagaland MLA Achumbeno Kikon appealed to the central government to heed the concerns of Naga communities residing on both sides of the border.

Without consensus from state governments and support from local populations, the fencing initiative along the Indo-Myanmar border may face serious volatility and delays in securing strategic installations like Integrated Check Posts (ICPs).

At the heart of these contradictions lies a critical policy dilemma. On one hand, India aspires to deepen ties with ASEAN nations, especially in the face of growing Chinese influence in the region.

On the other, it grapples with internal ethnic conflicts that have been aggravated by the Myanmar crisis—ultimately forcing a reconsideration of the Free Movement Regime. This delicate balancing act reveals the complex interplay between India’s foreign diplomacy and domestic stability.

To realize its border-linked vision, India must first transform the Northeast Region (NER) into a bastion of peace and development.

With nearly 99% of the region’s boundaries shared with neighboring countries, the NER stands as India’s primary diplomatic gateway to Southeast Asia. But this potential remains fragile if transnational crises—such as the one in Myanmar—continue to be overlooked, posing grave risks to India’s security architecture and regional strategy.

The author is Assistant Professor LHC, Manipur University & Research Scholar Jawaharlal Nehru University.

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