On March 19, 2025, Lalropui Pakhuongte, a middle-aged daily wage labourer, was killed by a stray bullet allegedly shot from an airgun during a mob fight that took place in Lamka (Churachandpur), Manipur.
What makes this incident in a corner of Manipur significant, however, is that such incidents, which are not otherwise rare in India, are hardly a matter of national media coverage. However, the recent incident has gleefully been projected as a ‘Zomi-Hmar” conflict, placing it as a rupture within the “Kuki-Zomi-Hmar” or “Kuki-Zomi” community in the backdrop of the current conflict.
Two elements are significant here: the transition from invisibility to hyper-visibility of the ‘tribes’ in mainstream media since the Manipur conflict started and how ‘internal complexities’ that had always existed are intentionally brought up or hidden by on-the-ground media contacts, often shaping narratives from ‘opposing’ sides of the conflict.
What makes this issue significant is how a brawl had started between a middle-aged drunk and some youth in Zenhang Lamka on 16th March (Sunday) and was orchestrated into a tool for communal rioting. As village volunteers of the area came across them, the fight was: 1. dispelled by them (according to one side) or 2. escalated by them (according to the other).
It was soon found that the middle-aged drunk happened to be the General Secretary of Hmar Innpui and also an office bearer in the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC). Nonetheless, the issue had supposedly been resolved between the Village Authority and the Tribe Council that night, with the intention of not letting it escalate into a communal issue. On the other hand, an FIR was filed on the youth who had beaten him in addition to charges of medical and other bills amounting up to Rs 2.5 lakh (and more if needed) as per customary law the next day.
The next morning however, a condemnation letter was made by the Hmar Innpui and Hmar Youth Association, which was followed within one hour, by condemnation letters from 20 other such nominally apex civil organizations.
The demand was for an emergency shutdown over the ‘targeted’ beating of a ‘Hmar leader’ by ‘Zomi’ village volunteers; the incident was suddenly given a communal spin, escalating into a ‘turf war’ that was immediately fed into several National Mainstream News headlines in that same communal manner; an obvious tell-tale of who gets to inform media and shape narratives and who does not.
The resulting escalation led to violent confrontations between mobs, and the activities that followed this mass fear psychosis: issuing of night curfew and nightly vigilance watches by village authorities all over the town and its peripheries.
In the light of what can be described as the now hyper-visibilization of issues in the state of Manipur combined with a scanty understanding of the internal differences among groups, this article attempts to highlight the significant role of ‘internal complexities’ in the current conflict in Manipur, both within the Meiteis as well as the Kuki-Zomi, and why they matter in this conflict.
‘Internal Complexities’ within the Meitei in Manipur
In the Media, the conflict in Manipur has usually been portrayed as an ethnic “Kuki-Meitei” conflict. While sounding simple, it could not be any farther from the truth. The non-Naga tribal community in Manipur is far removed from the singular picture of a ‘Kuki’ image, as is usually done for the Nagas.
On the other hand, although taking an ethnic overtone, the overwhelming composition of the state bureaucracy and offices of power by ethnic Meitei makes the distinction between Meitei and State narrative almost inseparable.
Continuing media coverage of the ongoing Manipur conflict now demands that internal differences and disputes be brought to critical analysis, bringing about new anxieties in this “blind spot” region of the country.
In the case of the Meitei, the connections between various Valley-Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs) and the State Government as well as civil society organizations, youth and student organizations highlight the competition and conflicts within Meitei society.
In Manipur, the general understanding one must have is that bureaucracy and insurgency are two sides of the same coin. In Imphal for example, the six main militant groups, that is, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREEPAK), etc have their student and civil wings, as well as supporters or connections that stretch into the highest ranks of bureaucracy and elected offices.
During college and University elections, it is not uncommon to see supporters of one particular group ending up in mob fights with supporters of another group, sometimes even leading to deaths.
Many of these organizations had sprung up as independentist/Secessionist organizations that campaigned for Manipuri independence. The UNLF, started in 1964 is the oldest such Manipuri/Meitei insurgent group. Other groups emerged over similar ideological or ethnic lines, all of whom have remained ideologically secessionist.
However, as a whole, the Coordinating Committee (CorCom) which was formed in July 2011 acts as a conglomerate of the seven major militant outfits – the KCP, KKYL, PREPAK, PREPAK-PRO, UNLF. There is another conglomerate: the Manipur People’s Liberation Front, of which the PLA, UNLF and PREPAK are members. This highlights the network of intersecting alliances and loyalties that cut across the Meitei populace in the state.
When it comes to political competition between competitors in the electoral realm of state politics, electoral politics in the state has merged with support from competing militant outfits, to whom, once elected, even the most reluctant politician must provide a modicum of loyalty and monetary percentages.
There are always a few civil or elected personnel who reach office due to their merit in electoral politics or hard work and dedication in bureaucracy. But they are the exceptions that prove the rule. In actuality, the test of the capable politician or bureaucrat in this instance is more measurable in how much they can ‘discipline’ (manipulate) both the militant outfits, as well as ‘central armed forces’ in their favour, far removed from the context-less and a-historic conception of what a democratic state is supposed to be.
‘Able and crafty’ politicians can often manage to influence and redirect the energies of their supportive militant outfits to wily craft their designs, and vice versa. The silencing of differences and dominance over competitors is usually achieved via a combination of public popularity, and addressing of ‘hot’ issues that flare up at certain moments.
The tactics used for silencing dissent change and take shape with changes in the government. While the previous Ibobi-led Congress Government was brought to its knees due to its inability to pass the three Anti-Tribal Bills (as the Kuki/Zomi tribes refer to them) in 2015, replaced by the rising fame of Biren Singh, as well as the BJP as a party that ‘does what it says’, on the promise that it will connect the hills-valley divide.
In the case of the Biren Singh-led government, there has been a change in tactics that manifested in the weaponization of Meitei religious revivalism and hyper-nationalism.
This came in the form of supposedly cultural groups like Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun which conducted ‘camping and training programs’ as well as ‘pilgrimage visits’ to Meitei religious and cultural symbols, combining both a Sanamahi revivalism and political mobilization. The erstwhile Manipur Raja Sanajaoba who was the previous inner Manipur MP became the explicit patron and symbolic rallying point for these groups.
Their vigilante activism and the turning of a blind eye by the government incumbency led to the silencing of both rational voices as well as political competition within the Meitei community.
One particular case can be taken to understand this: Brinda Thounaojam, the renowned police officer, has been an ardent critic of the political connections between Biren Singh, Lhunkhosei Zou the ADC Chairman who was caught in a huge drug trafficking case, and SS Olish (Biren’s second wife).
Such connections between politicians and business networks, including drugs are open secrets, even as the supercop’s own father’s previous chairmanship in the UNLF is also an open secret. Her activities as a political competition for the incumbent power holders led to the ransacking of her house several times, by unnamed vigilante groups, although, everyone knows that they are the Arambai Tenggol.
On the other hand, despite political competition within the community, the fact remains that no matter the political party that comes to power in the state, there will always be an overwhelming Meitei hegemony in the state.
This dominance, though resented by other ethnic groups, remains however an incomplete ambition among the Meiteis, with their historical grievances going as far back as the granting of the Kabaw valley to Burma by the British colonials. The idea was that in exchange, the hill areas which had never been ruled by the Manipur Kings were integrated into the modern state of Manipur by the British.
However, the setting in place of autonomous arrangements for the hills remained a thorn in their side, engendering a post-independence history of attempt after attempt by the Meiteis to dilute these arrangements; engendering anxiety and birthing autonomy movements in the hills.
While Naga nationalism and insurgency were already widespread among the Manipur Naga tribes, the growth of insurgency among the non-naga or Zo ethnic tribes is directly related to the subsequent attempt after an attempt to dilute autonomy arrangements in the hills.
Unlike the hill tribes however, it is important to note that the differences and conflicts that take place internally within the Meitei community are often on ideological, diplomatic and operational lines as opposed to ethnic differences that shape the internal complexities among the hill tribes.
That is, no matter their ideological differences, Meitei relate to a generally shared history, a singular language, a shared literary transition, shared myths of peoplehood, etc.
Internal Complexities among ‘Zo ethnic tribes’ in Manipur
Such internal complexities take a different shape in the form of the hill tribes that inhabit Manipur. Here, differences take a primarily ethnic tone, in the form of umbrella ethnic groups, and then in the form of particular tribes.
In this case, the categorisation of tribes has usually been made by the state government in the form of the Naga and the non-Naga or Zo ethnic tribes. The main difference between the two ethnic umbrellas is manifested in self-identification.
Those tribes that identify as Naga, do not do so based on a myth of common origin, or shared language, but as an emergent nationalism encompassing a conglomerate of diverse hill tribes, generally located more towards the northern hills and identified by the British as ‘Naga’. On the other hand, this self-identification takes on a different shape in the case of the Zo ethnic tribes as we shall see.
Although the Kuki and Naga umbrella categorizations have been used frequently by state representatives and mainstream media to refer to the hill tribes, the acceptance of ‘Kuki’ has never been consolidated in the state.
In 1947, the Kuki National Assembly (KNA) and the Khulmi Union (KU) emerged as separate political entities. The differences that emerged between the two manifested as the acceptance and rejection of ‘Kuki’ as the ethnic umbrella however goes back to pre-independence times.
The Thadou-speaking chiefs who had much closer ties with the Manipur kingdom and were closely embedded into the power structure of the new state championed the ‘Kuki’ cause, imposing Thadou as the link language for the tribes.
Both linguistic and categorical/nomenclature impositions were rejected by the non-Thadou-speaking clans as early as 1943 when several different tribes submitted a complaint to William Shaw (Author of “Notes on the Thadou-Kuki”), the then Political Agent to Manipur.
In general, these ‘kindred tribes’ do acknowledge that they belong to the same cultural family. Colonial writers have acknowledged their similarity in the form of the Kuki-Chin-Lushai.
However, the manner of usage and self-identification to these terms varied by how close the various networks of chiefs were to their respective state powers. This engendered a different form of anti-chief politics in Mizoram, leading to the emergence of a ‘Mizo’ nationalism.
The political dynamics in Manipur took a different shape as non-thadou speaking chiefs/clans were left in a marginalized position, who in time sought to initiate their own Indigenous political movements.
Towards the 1970s, the Zomi National Congress (ZNC) emerged as an attempt to re-integrate these disparate tribes into a single ethno-political umbrella: “Zomi”, and demanded the formation of a Union Territory for the Zo ethnic tribes. Both the ZNC and KNA made overtures to the MNF leadership for the inclusion of their territories in the Mizoram state.
These movements, which remained non-armed however, did not sway much attention of the state. Meanwhile, the ongoing Naga and Mizo armed movements had already shown the potency of armed insurrection.
The 1980s thus witnessed the establishment of the Kuki National Army (KNA) and the Kuki National Front (KNF). But internal squabbling caused their disintegration into several small militant outfits that were ideologically and operationally disunited except for their common championing of a Kuki cause.
The formation of the Zomi Reunification/Revolutionary Organization/Army (ZRO/A) in 1993 added a new layer by serving as a rallying point for the Zo ethnic kindred tribes that had rejected Kuki imposition.
Competing power struggles between the two major political umbrellas developed over time. The Zomis remained neutral during the Kuki-Naga conflict in 1993, opting rather to cater to the needs of the displaced on kinship and brotherhood terms. This however did not sit squarely with the Kuki militant outfits which demanded financial as well as ‘military’ support.
The denial of this support and misplaced anger over cordial Zomi-Naga relations seems to have eventually culminated in the Kuki-Zomi conflict in 1997-98 between the KNF-P and the ZRA. The joint peace teams of the Kuki Inpi and Zomi Council led to the signing of the Kuki-Zomi Peace Accord that directed the respect for individual preference of nomenclatures as well as territory/operational areas.
In subsequent years, the ZRA and some among the several Kuki groups engaged in several confrontations with Meitei militant organizations in the hill areas. The first Suspension of Operation (SoO) Agreement between the ZRA and the Ministry of Defence was in 2005.
This was followed later by the tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement in 2008, between the Central, State and an amalgamation of Kuki, Zomi and Hmar groups under the broad-based United People’s Front (UPF) alliance, and the Kuki National Organization (KNO). Since then, there has been a redrawn movement towards ‘re-unification’ of the various kindred tribes.
However the conception of ‘re-unification’ seems to be on different ‘grounds of understanding’. On the one hand, the KNO has driven a reunification as a Kuki narrative, on the other hand, the ZRO has completely rejected the term ‘Kuki’, and driven a reunification as a Zomi narrative.
This internal tussle had however settled into a particular status quo of mutual understanding and respect towards a common goal of constitutional safeguards for the Kuki-Zomi people.
The use of the term “Kuki-Zo” in media and political discourse was popularised initially by the Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum (ITLF) and later on by the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC). While seemingly inclusive, it is a manifestation of the internal tussle between the Zomi Re-Unification Organization (ZRO) and Kuki National Organization (KNO) that disturbed the status quo and modicum of understanding between the Zomis and Kukis.
This is manifest in the 2018 failed coup that took place within the ZRO which intended to position ZRO under the organizational fold of the KNO, disturbing the modicum of understanding. The hostilities that this created are masked by seemingly inclusive organizations like the ITLF and KZC, but, as the recent street brawling incident explicitly shows, have become trigger points of communal violence among the non-naga/Zo ethnic tribes in Manipur.
The casual conflation of these identities under the misnomer “Kuki-Zo” marks attempts to delegitimize the existing modicum of understanding but also incites new friction rather than transforming once-cooperative relationships into contested turf lines, as evident in the recent communal escalation in Lamka.
This semantic violence becomes particularly potent when filtered through selective media framing, leading to unequal representation and deepening fractures among Zo kindred tribes who are now forced to confront each other under externally imposed banners.
The internal escalation of violence in Lamka that claimed the life of Lalropui Pakhuongte is not an isolated tragedy but a manifestation of the deeply entwined socio-political tensions that lie beneath Manipur’s fractured surface.
While mainstream narratives flatten the conflict into a simplistic ethnic binary, Meitei versus Kuki, perhaps the truth is far more tangled. As this, both the Valley and the Hills are marked by internal fissures, shifting allegiances, and historical grievances that make any resolution incredibly complex.
Among the Meiteis, political power, insurgency, and civil society operate in overlapping and often complicit frameworks, creating hyper-visible machinery difficult to hold accountable.
Among the Zo ethnic groups, the fault lines are drawn not just along ideological or operational lines, but deeply entrenched in identity, nomenclature, and recognition, a legacy of colonial and postcolonial structuring of tribal hierarchies.
To ignore these internal complexities is to misunderstand the Manipur conflict entirely. Without recognizing the multiple layers of contestation, whether over land, representation, nomenclature, or historical memory, interventions by the state, media, or civil society will continue to be shallow and ultimately ineffective.
What Manipur needs now is not just peace talks between opposing ethnic fronts, but also a deeper reckoning with the contradictions, silences, and manipulations within each community. Only then can we begin to imagine an inclusive, grounded, and just peace.
Views expressed are that of the author and do not reflect EastMojo’s position on this or any other related matter.
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