China’s Medog Dam is a geopolitical weapon disguised as green energy

The Medog Hydropower Project—poised to become the world’s largest hydropower dam—is currently under construction on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River) in Tibet’s Medog County, close to the contested India-China border.

With an estimated cost of $167 billion, the project, initiated in July 2025, is expected to generate 60,000 MW and 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually—surpassing the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam. Managed by PowerChina, the project includes five cascading stations and four 20-km tunnels, with completion targeted for 2033.

While China has promoted the dam as a green energy initiative, its strategic placement near Arunachal Pradesh raises concerns about its use as a geopolitical tool.

Control over the Brahmaputra’s flow gives China the ability to influence water availability downstream, threatening agriculture, fisheries, and energy security in India and Bangladesh.

Lok Sabha MP Tapir Gao (BJP, Arunachal Pradesh) has described the project as a “ticking water bomb” that could be deployed against India and other riparian states, endangering the livelihoods of communities in Arunachal Pradesh.

China’s increasing grip over the Brahmaputra underscores a troubling dimension of regional geopolitics and poses a formidable challenge to cooperative water management.

The Geopolitical Weaponisation of Water

The Medog Dam is widely regarded as a strategic manoeuvre by China to assert dominance over the Himalayan water systems. Its upstream location on the Brahmaputra gives Beijing substantial leverage over a river that is critical to the sustenance and development of millions in India and Bangladesh.

With a massive reservoir capable of storing billions of cubic meters of water, China could potentially manipulate flows to induce artificial floods or droughts in downstream areas—a tactic particularly worrying given its historical use of water as a coercive tool.

The lack of a binding water-sharing treaty between China, India, and Bangladesh exacerbates this concern. The 2006 Expert-Level Mechanism (ELM) for hydrological data sharing is non-binding and has proven unreliable.

For instance, during the 2017 Doklam standoff, China unilaterally suspended critical flood-related hydrological data to India, demonstrating a willingness to leverage water resources during political tensions.

The dam’s proximity to Arunachal Pradesh—which China claims as “South Tibet”—further amplifies its strategic significance. This geographic asymmetry allows Beijing to exploit water control to gain advantage in diplomatic disputes, raising fears of deliberate flooding in India’s Northeast or restricted water flow to Bangladesh. The result is a persistent cloud of uncertainty that strengthens China’s hand in regional diplomacy.

Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu has called the project an “existential threat” to the Siang region, warning it poses risks second only to military conflict. “The issue is that China cannot be trusted. No one knows what they might do,” he said, echoing concerns over unpredictability and the potential for ecological and humanitarian crises triggered by sudden water releases.

Moreover, the dam has implications beyond the Brahmaputra basin. It could impact India-Pakistan water dynamics, particularly as China and Pakistan continue to expand collaboration through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China’s growing economic influence in Bangladesh, through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, further limits Dhaka’s ability to align with India on upstream water issues, thus tilting the balance further in China’s favour.

Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts

The dam’s environmental consequences are also deeply concerning. The Brahmaputra basin is home to a rich and fragile Himalayan ecosystem. Large-scale damming is likely to disrupt sediment flows, degrade aquatic habitats, and increase the risk of glacial lake outburst floods in a seismically volatile zone.

China’s assurances that the project will not harm downstream ecosystems are viewed with skepticism—especially given the ecological damage caused by its Mekong River dams, which altered river morphology and reduced fish stocks in Southeast Asia.

Reduced sediment flow could severely impact soil fertility in Assam and Bangladesh’s floodplains, with direct consequences for agricultural productivity.

Former Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Nabam Tuki has called for thorough environmental impact assessments and transparency regarding both China’s Medog Dam and India’s own counter-dam initiatives. He raised concerns about the ecological and social consequences of large-scale dams for Arunachal Pradesh’s tribal communities, particularly in the context of seismic vulnerability.

Tuki’s concerns are echoed by civil society organisations like the Siang Indigenous Farmers Forum (SIFF), which have opposed India’s counter-dams citing risks to local ecosystems and cultural heritage.

In Assam, opposition leader Debabrata Saikia has warned that the Medog Dam could exacerbate climate-induced flooding and soil erosion, threatening agriculture, fisheries, and rural livelihoods. He also criticised China’s lack of transparency and called for urgent diplomatic measures.

The socio-economic stakes are high. In India’s northeast, millions depend on the Brahmaputra for farming, fishing, and transportation. Sudden water releases from upstream could flood farmlands and settlements, while restricted flows could dry up irrigation channels and affect drinking water supplies.

In Bangladesh, where nearly 70% of the population relies on the Brahmaputra basin, disruptions could lead to food insecurity and large-scale displacement. These risks are magnified by India’s Upper Siang Multipurpose Project (SUMP), which, while conceived as a countermeasure, faces local opposition over potential displacement and environmental damage.

India’s Countermeasures and Strategic Dilemma

Given the transboundary nature of the Brahmaputra, cooperative water governance is essential. However, geopolitical rivalries and mistrust obstruct meaningful collaboration.

International law offers limited remedies, and downstream nations like India and Bangladesh are left to rely on soft power strategies such as diplomatic pressure and international advocacy—an uphill task against Beijing’s growing regional hegemony.

India has adopted a multi-pronged response. It continues to engage China through the 2006 Expert-Level Mechanism and is fast-tracking strategic hydropower projects like the 11,000 MW Upper Siang and the 2,880 MW Dibang Multipurpose Project.

These are designed to buffer abrupt water releases from upstream, regulate flow, and store water during dry spells. The SUMP, with a massive 9.2 billion cubic meter reservoir, is central to this strategy.

However, it cannot negate the upstream advantage that China enjoys. Moreover, local opposition to the SUMP due to displacement and seismic risks complicates its implementation.

Regional political leaders have called for more robust diplomacy. Debabrata Saikia urged the Ministry of External Affairs to pursue: (1) a binding bilateral water-sharing treaty with China, (2) improved flood forecasting via enhanced data sharing, and (3) a multilateral framework involving China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh to manage shared Himalayan rivers.

He underscored the urgency of safeguarding Assam’s hydrological interests through stronger diplomatic leadership.

Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal confirmed that India has conveyed its concerns to Beijing and called on China to ensure that downstream states are not adversely affected. “We will continue to monitor and take necessary measures to protect our interests,” he said, stressing the potential impact on Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Bangladesh.

Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, meanwhile, has expressed cautious optimism about existing data-sharing protocols with China but has not publicly opposed India’s counter-dam projects, advocating a pragmatic approach instead.

India’s strategic predicament is further complicated by its border tensions with China. The Medog Dam’s location near Arunachal Pradesh intertwines water security with territorial disputes, making cooperation more elusive. While India has worked to bolster ties with Bangladesh, recent political changes in Dhaka and China’s growing investments there constrain regional alignment.

Domestically, the challenge is to balance national security with local community concerns, especially in sensitive ecological zones like Arunachal.

China’s construction of the Medog Dam exemplifies how natural resources are being weaponised to serve broader geopolitical strategies.

By controlling the Brahmaputra, Beijing enhances its ability to exert non-military pressure on downstream nations, aligning with its doctrine of “unrestricted warfare.” The dam’s proximity to Arunachal Pradesh links water control with territorial disputes, significantly enhancing its strategic value.

India’s Upper Siang and Dibang projects offer partial countermeasures but are fraught with domestic opposition and ecological concerns.

The lack of a multilateral water governance framework deepens regional instability, allowing unilateral actions by China to undermine collective resource management.

To mitigate these risks, downstream countries must prioritise innovative ‘hydro-diplomacy’—leveraging economic incentives, regional alliances, and international norms to promote responsible upstream behaviour.

Without a legally binding treaty, the Medog Dam poses a long-term threat to water security, ecological stability, and geopolitical equilibrium in South Asia. A coordinated, inclusive, and rules-based approach to transboundary river governance is not only urgent—it is essential.

Views expressed are that of the author and do not reflect EastMojo’s stance on this or any other issue. The author is a Independent Researcher currently pursuing his Ph.D. from Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi.

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