Have you noticed something important about the recent reporting from Manipur? News about violence between Kuki-Zos and Meiteis has been down to almost zero, something we could not have imagined two or three months ago. It is perhaps no coincidence that this ‘relative’ peace corresponds with the change of guard in the state with the imposition of the President’s Rule.
Significantly, village volunteers handed over arms and ammunition to the police in the Churachandpur district. Others also followed. The handing over of arms by the Arambai Tenggol was much publicised and drew public attention not only in the state but also outside it. Moreover, several arms and ammunition were seized during raids and operations by security forces.
No doubt, many of the looted arms or sophisticated weapons in the possession of the village volunteers on both sides are still very much intact with them. But this is a significant development and symbolic as a slow sign of people being ready to come forward to stop the violence.
Buffer zones are reportedly destroyed to enable movement. The national highways—Jiribam Road and Dimapur Line—have seen free vehicle movement. Small businesses are picking up, though not on a large scale.
Government offices are functioning, though the work is slow. Many development works are halted. All matters must be sent to Imphal, and thus it takes a lot of time for work to be done, particularly in Kuki-Zo districts.
At this juncture, the Meitei and Kuki-Zo conflict moves on from gun firings, killings, mob rampage, vandalising houses and village burnings to debates, narratives—counter-narratives, claims and counterclaims on intellectual platforms, panel discussions, and TV studio debates. The fight actively continues on social media. Such fights aren’t possible for security forces or the President’s Rule to clamp down on.
For instance, a panel discussion titled “Manipur Ki Baat” was held in Delhi on February 18 this year, with eminent persons, former bureaucrats, and security experts speaking on issues confronting the state and deliberating on possible ways forward. A week or so later, an immediate rebuttal of the said event, with Meitei scholars and intellectuals dissecting in detail and countering every speaker’s presentations, was held in Imphal.
The program was telecast live, and the record was later available on social media.
There are innumerable counter-narratives, responses, and counter-responses between the Meiteis and Kuki-Zos in the media and digital spaces. Imphal local television channels are abuzz with debates and analyses almost daily.
Unfortunately, though, most of the debates and analyses do not have any solution to the problem. Every topic and subject on and about the conflict is being discussed and scrutinised.
One thing strikingly obvious is that even though women are actively participating in the conflict, they are not seen or heard in the TV studios.
On the other hand, the Kuki-Zo civil society and tribal organisations are caught up in issuing clarifications, reactions, and responses to Meitei CSOs and intellectuals’ claims, accusations, and allegations. At least one press statement is being released almost daily to state their “stand” or assert their “position” by the Kuki-Zo CSOs.
Narratives have been among the key contestations in the ongoing war between the Meiteis and the Kuki-Zos. Both sides counter each other’s narratives—tooth and nail.
The fight is not merely physical or geographical but in narratives. History is one of the prominent, crucial contests in the fight. Whose history is more authentic, accurate, or correct? Whose narrative is better? Or who is more incorrect or wrong?
Analyses, debates, claims and counterclaims are value additions to the Manipur conflict. While common men and women are on the frontlines fighting the so-called “war,” the suited, booted, and educated elites fight through debates, narratives, writings, and, of course, social media. A section of the middle class is fighting the “war” digitally and on public platforms. The English-speaking class is now actually fueling and provoking the conflict.
More than twenty months on, the majority of the displaced in the Manipur crisis continue to languish in relief camps. Dry rations—rice and dal—are provided by the district administrations. Not more than that. The rest is taken care of by philanthropic organisations. By now, the displaced population is seen to be engaged in some form of activity, like handloom, crafts, going for cultivation and construction, or working as roadside vendors.
Challenges are huge. A herculean task is ahead of the President’s Rule. The government has attempted to bridge the divide, announcing the much-publicised “free movement” and providing transport between the districts but has failed. The buses that were sent to ply between the Meitei districts and Kuki-Zo areas were not only empty but were even burned down. Instead, it provoked sentiments and brought more tension, even re-igniting violence that had almost died down. This is one of the key visible signs that the two warring communities have not seen eye-to-eye.
As recently as early April, a meeting of the Meitei and Kuki-Zo CSOs was held in New Delhi. This effort is noteworthy. But it is too early to expect a notable turnover. Too early and too vague to comment upon what the possible impact of the meeting between the two civil societies under the facilitation of the Home Ministry will be.
There is disquiet, though violence has not been reported for some time. The question is, are the so-called village volunteers ready to hang up their boots? Are they ready to say, “We have had enough,” and return to normal lives? Both sides are still “alert” and armed.
Physical boundaries may not be drawn or fenced, but the two communities are still clearly divided along geographical lines and, most importantly, in their minds. People-to-people contact—as far as Meiteis and Kuki-Zos are concerned—has not happened and is not likely to happen soon. There is no civilian movement between districts, as in Kuki-Zos visiting the Imphal Valley or Meiteis visiting Kuki-Zo areas.
Manipur needs a solution. And most importantly, political willingness. Only an immediate balm—in terms of “talking in Delhi”—will be just a short-term solution. There could be some outcome of the “Delhi Meetings,” like agreeing to disarm their respective communities or end violence, or agreeing to open the national highways, etc. But these will be short-lived.
The conflict can reignite anytime, anywhere. It requires a long-term solution. Manipur has always witnessed and experienced conflict of all forms and levels; therefore, it needs to be dealt with through more than just “meetings in Delhi” and signing some “MoUs” by CSOs.
Much as the state of Manipur is diverse, it also requires a diverse form of solution. It is also crucial that the central leadership come down to Manipur more often than just parachuting once in two years. An interaction, discussion of solutions, and understanding of issues on the ground with people will add tremendous value and have an immense impact—rather than a “meeting in Delhi.”
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