Manipur’s ethnic conflict, which erupted on May 3, 2023, between the Meitei and Zo (Kuki-Zomi-Hmar) communities, has escalated into a full-blown crisis, marked by periodic violence inching further from a stable de-escalation. More recently, the alleged use of drone bombs by both sides points towards a steady escalation of the violence that has engulfed the state.
Sixteen months and counting
Over 32 lakh people in Manipur live in constant fear of conflict escalation, mirroring a Ukraine & Myanmar-like situation for the last 16 months. While China’s aggression is considered the greatest external security threat, Manipur remains the most significant internal issue at hand.
Nevertheless, the loss of over 250 lives, the displacement of over 60,000 people, the de facto partition of the hills and valley, the leaked audio tapes of the Chief Minister, and his multiple resignation attempt dramas only get partly covered by mainstream media, mirroring the narrative of an already compromised state.
The futures of many youth have become stuck in limbo as nightly stays in frontline bunkers become normalized, while tribal aspirants are forced to travel hundreds of kilometres to nearby states to take their SSC exams, causing not only physical toil but also economic drainage.
It is reported that about 60,000 central paramilitary forces have been deployed in Manipur, comparable to the number of displaced people in the state.
Despite this large and extensive deployment of troops, and without downplaying their crucial life-saving role in transporting the stranded populace in both the hills and the valley, there continues to be intermittent exchanges of fire from across cracks in the buffer zones.
Inspecting the relief camps, CRPF Deputy Inspector General Manish Kumar Sachar pointed out that the IDPs’ welfare demand was not revenge but to lead a normal life. As noted by P. Chidambaram, Manipur today is divided into two de facto states.
The Kuki-Zomi control large swathes of Churachandpur, Kangpokpi, and parts of Tengnoupal, while the Meitei dominate the valley districts. The Kuki-Zomi run a parallel administration with no Meitei government employees operating in their areas, and neither community appears willing to cohabit with a unified Manipur.
There is no dialogue—neither between the government and ethnic groups nor between the Meitei and Kuki-Zomi communities. This absence of political engagement exacerbates distrust and deepens the divide. Given this situation of sporadic firings, the last 16 months have become comparable to the worst years of insurgency during the 1960s–1990s in states like Assam, Nagaland, and Mizoram.
The Government of India has, in the past, dealt with several insurgencies with a mix of military interventions and political dialogues. Drawing on experiences from neighboring hill states of Nagaland and Mizoram, the Centre must prioritize political dialogue over extensive military intervention in Manipur.
Mizoram, Nagaland, and Manipur are connected
Mizoram: The Mizoram insurgency of the 1960s–1980s was largely driven by a sense of neglect and marginalization, exacerbated by the Indian government’s inadequate response to the 1959 Mautam famine. It came to a peaceful resolution through a combination of military pressure and political negotiation.
The 1986 Mizoram Peace Accord succeeded largely because Mizoram’s relative ethnic homogeneity allowed for a more cohesive peace-building effort. The Accord, though leaving several objectives of the movement in limbo, was stated by Laldenga, leader of MNF, as “neither what we want, nor what India wants” as a mid-way compromise that has proven its durability through the following decades.
Nagaland: The Naga insurgency had much older pre-independence roots with the formation of the Naga National Council (NNC). The peace process in Nagaland has been less successful; the Shillong Accord (1975), though bringing an end to the Angami-led NNC insurgency, birthed the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN). This consisted of a largely dissatisfied Tangkhul, Sumi, and Konyak leadership and cadre base.
The NSCN further broke into two factions based on geographical and tribe-based cadre/leaderships. In 1997, a ceasefire agreement brought the factions under a ceasefire with the Government of India. The slow progress of talks, however, led to disillusionment, but the 2015 political dialogue made some further progress in eventually bringing all major Naga factions into suspension of operations.
Manipur: Manipur’s demography is much more complex than either Nagaland or Mizoram, being home to multiple ethnic groups with distinct languages, cultures, and political demands.
On one hand, the continuous threat of attacks has pushed many youth on both sides to stand as Village Volunteers. On the other hand, the growing influence of Meitei insurgent groups in valley politics and the populist approach of CM Biren Singh have seemingly opened undercurrent channels for Meitei insurgent cadres to infiltrate state institutions like the police and instigate militias like Arambai Tenggol.
This is representative of the balance of power felt by the communities on the ground, building pressure towards active involvement among the Kuki, Zomi, and Hmar insurgent outfits that have, until now, suspended active operations.
Need for differentiated political solutions
Every Indian citizen’s aspirations revolve around the fundamental right to live with dignity—under a safe roof, with food on the table, and the assurance that their human rights will be protected. In Manipur, these fundamental rights have been tragically violated, and it would not be wrong to assume that the worst affected on both sides, including about 10,000 displaced Meiteis and 50,000 displaced Kuki-Zomis, desire peace.
Any lasting peace, however, requires a politically negotiated agreement. It is a moral imperative for the Indian government to restore peace to both the valley and the hills. The ongoing conflict is not just a regional issue; it is a national crisis that hinders India’s growth as a rising global power and a beacon of democracy.
Charting a path forward
Manipur must have a bold and humane political solution to achieve long-term peace. The best way forward may be to recognize the unique needs of the Meitei-majority valley and the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar-dominated hills. The precedent has been set in the Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreements that lay the ground for a constitutional mechanism for autonomy of the hills.
The SoO agreement was first signed between the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) and the central government in 2005, with the promise of political dialogues. This was followed by the formation of the United People’s Front (UPF) with the Hmar People Convention (HPC-D), the Kuki National Front (KNF-P), and other groups, which then entered the SoO pact in 2006.
The Kuki National Organization (KNO) and its constituent member organizations joined the SoO following this development in 2008. The first actual political dialogues started in 2019 and were seemingly on the verge of reaching a peaceable agreement in early 2023.
For peace, it is imperative for political dialogue to resume and bring all stakeholders to the negotiating table. A purely militaristic approach is only likely to escalate conflicts between warring factions as well as cause societal breakdown beyond the already disastrous proportions in the state.
Recognizing the need for separate administrative units for the valley and the hills could pave the way for self-governance and long-term peace, ultimately strengthening India’s commitment to human rights and social cohesion.
By addressing this internal conflict with sensitivity and foresight, India can not only heal the wounds of Manipur but also strengthen its democratic fabric, ensuring that every citizen—regardless of ethnicity or geography—can thrive in a peaceful and prosperous nation.
Sangmuan Hangshing is a Public Policy Student at Kautilya School of Public Policy and Tawna Valte is a PhD Student at the University of Hyderabad. Views expressed are personal.
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