The state of Mizoram has been grappling with the impact of conflicts in neighbouring regions. The crisis began with the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, which forced thousands to flee the junta and seek refuge in Mizoram. Currently, the state hosts over 33,000 refugees from Myanmar. However, it is not just Myanmar experiencing unrest; clashes between civilians and armed personnel in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts have driven over 2,000 people to Mizoram.
Additionally, conflict in the neighbouring Indian state of Manipur led to approximately 11,000 people fleeing to Mizoram last year. While some have since returned or relocated to other states, the Mizoram home department reports around 7000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in the state.
Despite ethnic ties between the people of Mizoram and those from Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Manipur, concerns are growing about whether these bonds can withstand the strain on the state’s land and economic resources. Mizoram, which relies on the central government for over 80% of its financial needs, is facing increasing challenges as it struggles to sustain its fragile economy.
A former NGO employee who worked with refugees in Zokhawthar and Champhai district told EastMojo, “Local NGOs are quite weary of the refugees. There is an underlying tension among the people as even locals face a scarcity of jobs. Adding to their frustrations, some refugees occasionally exhibit greed and prejudice, further straining relations.”
In Aizawl, the capital city, discussions about refugees among higher echelons and labour communities have started reflecting an attitude of apprehension. During a conversation EastMojo had with a group of junior government staff, they expressed frustration toward the refugee community. They noted that it has become increasingly difficult for their friends and relatives to find daily labour jobs, as refugees often accept lower wages and secure work more easily.
However, as unrest continues in Myanmar, many refugees have no choice but to seek safety in Mizoram. It remains one of the few states welcoming refugees from Myanmar, owing to its close ethnic ties with them.
“We tried to stay in our homes for as long as possible, but they started attacking with bombs and rockets. When they began attacking from the air, we had no other choice but to flee,” said 70-year-old refugee Khualthanga. He was living with his family of three in a makeshift camp in Zokhawthar, in a hut built on bamboo stilts.
“There are many intelligence spies from the junta, so it is dangerous for us,” he explained. Despite this, Khualthanga continues to farm in his homeland. Along with other villagers, he crosses the river from time to time to tend to his farm in his village in Myanmar before returning to the refugee camp where he stays in India’s Mizoram. Their primary fear is not of working but of living in their homeland.
The topography of the refugee camp and their home village is strikingly similar, and the people share the same ethnic roots. This shared identity traces back to the Zo ethnic group, whose lands were divided between India and Myanmar during the British colonial period when the India-Myanmar border was demarcated.
In his book A Political Geography (1971), B.L. Sukhwal states that the India-Myanmar boundary stretches approximately 1,450 kilometres, extending from its southernmost point to the northern tri-junction where the borders of India, Myanmar, and China meet. The boundary traverses densely forested hill regions, with the Mizo Hills, Manipur, and Nagaland on the Indian side, and the Chin Hills, Naga Hills, and Kachin State on the Myanmar side.
A study by Lalmalsawma Ralte from Government Hrangbana College and Prof. Vishwambar Prasad Sati, Assistant Professor at Mizoram University, found that the entire India-Myanmar boundary was left un-demarcated by the British Government. Since both countries were under the same colonial power, boundary-related issues did not arise before their independence. However, after independence, resolving the boundary issue became a significant matter for both nations.
The boundary traverses densely forested hill regions, with the Mizo Hills, Manipur, and Nagaland on the Indian side, and the Chin Hills, Naga Hills, and Kachin State on the Myanmar side. These boundaries have long been regarded by the local inhabitants as arbitrary lines drawn by the British under the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826.
During British rule, the Lushai Hills were excluded from the operation of the Reform Acts of 1919 and 1935, leaving the Lushais outside the mainstream of Indian national life. They had no representation in administrative matters and were not permitted to voice their opinions on issues concerning their land or boundaries. For administrative purposes, their contiguous territory was divided into several divisions, disregarding ethnic, cultural, and linguistic considerations.
Mizoram leaders, including the present Chief Minister Lalduhoma, have often expressed their frustration at the border lines drawn by the British. In March 2024, Lalduhoma said: “The British colonialists, motivated solely by administrative convenience, imposed boundaries without any regard for the sentiments of the populace, employing the divisive ‘Divide and Rule’ policy. Such imposed borders cannot be accepted.”
Adding to the hardships faced by refugees, the government’s plans to enforce stricter regulations at the borders including scrapping of the Free Movement Regime, have begun to disrupt their daily lives. Previously, trucks would cross the rivers carrying goods for sale, and young men and women from the refugee community earned a livelihood by unloading these goods.
“This was our only source of income. Here, we could earn around Rs. 200 a day, which helped us sustain ourselves. Now, we don’t even have enough money to buy sufficient rice for our families. Without the support of NGOs, we would be starving,” said Sangliana, a refugee.
During the first week of December, Mizoram Assembly Speaker Lalbiakzama formally unveiled the Zo Indigenous Identity Card, a project developed by ZORO. Speaking at the event, Lalbiakzama emphasized the significance of the United Nations’ recognition of indigenous peoples, referencing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, introduced in 2007, which aims to protect their rights. He praised ZORO for crafting the Zo Indigenous Identity Card in line with the principles of this declaration and expressed hope that it would help the Zo people safeguard their rights.
The Speaker also addressed the historical struggles of the Zo people, highlighting their status as some of the worst victims of the British colonial government’s divide-and-rule policy. He pointed out that the Zo people were forcibly divided across three countries—India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh—and spread over four Indian states: Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, and Assam. Despite these divisions, he reaffirmed the strength of their bonds, saying, “Our connections are not lost, and we will continue to support one another.”
However, the unveiling of the Zo Indigenous Identity Card comes amidst heightened sensitivity surrounding issues of Zo identity and unity. Last month, Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma’s remarks during Chin Day celebrations in the United States sparked significant debate. His call for unity among the Zo indigenous peoples of Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India was controversially framed by a Goa Chronicle journalist as advocating for the establishment of a “Christian nation.”
This mischaracterization intensified tensions, raising concerns about the potential implications of movements aimed at indigenous solidarity. Critics argued that such statements could be misconstrued as challenges to national sovereignty, while supporters viewed them as essential affirmations of the Zo people’s shared cultural and historical identity.
The Zo Indigenous Identity Card itself has faced similar scrutiny. L. Ramdinliana Renthlei, General Secretary of ZORO General Headquarters in Aizawl, elaborated on its significance in a statement. He explained, “The Zo Indigenous Identity Card is based on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Despite border demarcations, indigenous people can continue to visit each other, strengthen their ties, and offer support when needed. Whether in terms of community, religion, economy, or politics, they can remain connected. This ID card will be crucial in ensuring access to our rights.”
Renthlei emphasized the card’s role in solidifying the Zo people’s identity, stating, “This Zo Indigenous Identity Card will leave a lasting mark on our identity and enable us, the Zo people from India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, to visit each other freely. It also affirms that we are part of the Indigenous Peoples Organisation (IPO).”
He further explained that ZORO intends to notify international and regional authorities about the initiative, saying, “The Zo Indigenous ID will be shared with the United Nations and the governments of India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh to ensure better understanding and recognition.”
Renthlei’s optimism about the Zo Indigenous Identity Card underscores its potential to strengthen cultural and familial ties across borders. However, this vision is met with cautious scepticism by others. CV Lalmalsawmi, a writer and political analyst from Mizoram, raised concerns about its practical impact, particularly in addressing the immediate challenges faced by the Zo people. She remarked, “While this may be a welcome addition to the ongoing solidarity movement among Mizo-Kuki-Chin families, I am sceptical about how much difference bearing such an ID card can make on the ground in ensuring protection and security for those currently facing state or military-led persecution, as well as assaults on their rights, dignity, safety, and livelihoods.”
“The real challenge lies in reconciling the UN’s efforts with national and state-level policies,” she added. “Right now, the need of the hour is to empower people based on their political and civil rights as citizens, rather than solely focusing on indigeneity as the definitive solution to bring about realistic change.”
To gain a deeper understanding of the Zo Indigenous Identity Card, EastMojo reached out to Dr. Rini Ralte, General Secretary of the Foreign Affairs and Refugee Committee, to discuss how the initiative addresses the challenges faced by the Zo people across different regions. Dr. Ralte explained, “The ID is intended to better connect the Zo people across various regions, whether national or international, by sharing the same identity card. This helps to strengthen the sense of solidarity among them.”
Highlighting the broader benefits of the card, she added, “The potential benefit of the ID is to reclaim our roots, which encompass our history, culture, tradition, and faith. It serves a holistic aspect of survival, growth, greater sharing, and preservation of resources.”
Addressing the role of the Mizoram government, Dr. Ralte clarified, “The Government of Mizoram is not directly involved in this process. However, when our people need assistance—whether for safety, humanitarian aid, or other issues—the government does not shy away. For example, in March 2021, then-Chief Minister Zoramthanga stood against the Union Home Minister’s directive not to provide shelter to those crossing the border. Similarly, the current Chief Minister, Lalduhoma, has expressed his ethnic affinities and opposition to border fencing. ZORO has been affiliated with the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) since 2004 and operates independently of the Mizoram government.”
When asked whether the Zo Indigenous Identity Card could be seen as a step toward unification, potentially conflicting with the Indian Constitution, Dr. Ralte responded, “Yes, indeed, because we share the same identity card. Our movement across borders will become easier, and ZORO is working to inform the concerned authorities. This will lead to better integration among Zo people. Anyone holding the ID will feel proud. While it may not impact directly, it fosters a sense of belonging. For instance, possessing it gives you a sense of pride and identity.”
She also addressed concerns about potential misinterpretation, saying, “The bigger issue right now is that the ID may be misinterpreted by the Central government and the media, potentially blown out of proportion. We are not troubled by this because our larger goal is to support one another—our brothers and sisters who are victimized by the military, mismanagement in Manipur, and the resurfacing of land and boundary disputes. In these contexts, the ID will facilitate free movement. Objections may arise, but the card will ultimately serve the Zo ethnic groups, wherever they may be.”
F. Lalramhluni, a Political Science professor and author, also shared her perspective with EastMojo, urging a careful evaluation of the political implications such a move might have. She emphasized the importance of respecting political boundaries while promoting unity in diversity. She stated, “We will always be culturally connected, but there are political boundaries that divide us, whether we accept it or not. These political demarcations inevitably impact our socio-economic life. I am not entirely certain about the extent to which this initiative will serve us, but we need to carefully assess its potential impact. Could it harm our state’s relationship with the central government? While fostering cultural unity wherever we are, we must also remember Article 21, which ensures the right to life and personal liberty, and use these rights to promote multiculturalism.”
She further cautioned, “These cards should not negatively impact our sense of identity and brotherhood.”
This story has been published as part of the AIPP-EastMojo Fellowship 2024
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